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Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial
under the Seventh Amendment
For almost two centuries the Seventh Amendment1 has been inter-
preted to preserve the right to a civil jury trial as it existed at common
law in England in 1791,2 the year the Amendment was adopted. Over
the past fifteen years, however, the Supreme Court has presided over
a broad expansion of the right to civil jury trial. 3 Where Congress
has sought to limit the scope of jury trial by statute, the Court's ex-
pansive reading of the Seventh Amendment appears to clash with the
legislative will. One such conflict is in the area of civil rights. Because
juries hearing such suits may be biased against the plaintiff's claims, 4
and because the delay5 and cost of jury trial may inhibit prosecution
of such actions, Congress indicated that some civil rights actions
should be tried to the court alone.6 Courts, for their part, have gen-
erally ruled against the demand for a jury trial7 in these actions
1. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Dimick
v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364,
377-78 (1913). See generally F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 337 (1965); 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL
'RACTICE 38.08[5], at 79 (2d ed. 1971).
3. The key cases have been Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
For explanations of the nature of the expansion, see 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcrICE
r38.11[9], at 128.20-.23 (2d ed. 1971); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACriCE
AND PROCEDURE § 2302, at 21-22 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; James,
Right to Jury Trial in a Civil Action, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 687 (1963).
4. Goldfarb & Kurzman, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: The Jury Trial Issue, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 486, 487 (1965); Comment, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 167 (1969); Note, Jones v. Mayer:
The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUaI. L.
REV. 1019, 1051 (1969).
5. See Zeisel, The Jury and Court Delay, 328 ANNALS 46, 47 (1960); Note, Ross v.
Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112, 123-26
(1971).
6. See p. 417 infra.
7. Many courts have held the jury trial right not to exist in actions under 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972)
(Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972); Johnson v. Georgia High-
way Exp., Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969); Lowry v. Whitaker Cable Corp.,
318 F. Supp. 202, 209 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1972); United States v. Ambac Industries, 15 FED.
RULES SERv. 2d 607 (D. Mass. 1971); Gillen v. Federal Paper Board Co., 52 F.R.D. 383,
386 (D. Conn. 1970). But cf. King v. Local 818, Laborers, 443 F.2d 273, 275 (6th Cir.
1971) (trial court granted motion for jury trial in Title VII action).
Courts have also held there is no jury trial right in employment discrimination
actions for reinstatement and lost wages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (the
Civil Rights Act of 1871). See, e.g., McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199,
202, 204 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972); Harkless v. Sweeny Independent
School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 323-24 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971);
Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir. 1966).
One district court has gone so far as to hold that all suits under § 1983 are
equitable. Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Jones v. Witten-
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despite the fact that the Supreme Court's modern Seventh Amend-
ment doctrine seems to mandate the opposite result. None of the ra-
tionalia used by these courts in their holdings is particularly com-
pelling.8
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's recent cases on the
Seventh Amendment construe that provision not to preserve a purely
historical categorization of actions as legal or equitable. Instead, the
Court's theory of the Seventh Amendment rests on the principle that
an action can be equitable in nature if law is inadequate and that the
indication of this inadequacy is a rational congressional mandate that
the suit be tried to the judge alone. This interpretation of recent
Seventh Amendment cases furnishes the Court, which is presently
considering the issue, 10 with a broad and logical argument for holding
many statutory civil rights actions not to be triable to a jury.1 In
addition, it could provide a basis in the future for limitation of the
right to jury trial by Congress should it determine that considerations
of justice and efficiency so require.
I
In Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act12 Congress created an
action for employment discrimination, triable only to a judge rather
berg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), afj"d on other grounds sub nom. Jones v.
Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). This holding is more remarkable for its boldness
than its authority.
See also note 10 infra.
8. See note 49 infra.
9. See note 3 supra & part II infra.
10. Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2770
(1973). This was a Title VIII (42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970)) housing discrimination action
in which plaintiffs sought money damages. The district court rejected defendant's de-
mand that a jury be empaneled to hear the claim, but the court of appeals reversed
and held there was a right to jury trial. The same result was reached in Kelly v.
Armbrust, 351 F. Supp. 869 (D.N.D. 1972); Kastner v. Brackett, 326 F. Supp. 1151 (D.
Nev. 1971). Contra, Cauley v. Smith, 347 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Va. 1972). The latter was
a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) for money damages as well as injunctive and
declaratory relief based on defendant's allegedly racially motivated refusal to rent an
apartment. The court concluded that no right to jury trial attached under § 3612(c).
It found the legislative history unhelpful in discovering the nature of the relief pro-
vided by the statute, but characterized the money relief as restitutive and therefore
equitable. Id. at 115. Although the statute also provides for the award of punitive
damages, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970), the court concluded that the limitation placed on
the amount of such damages maintained the statute's equitable character despite the
apparently legal nature of punitive damages. See Note, Monetary Claims Under Section
1983: The Right to Trial by Jury, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHrs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 613 (1973).
The Seventh Circuit has taken an opposite view with regard to the restitutive character
of the remedies under Title VIII. Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1122 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2770 (1973).
11. This Note does not discuss whether jury trial ought to be provided in civil rights
cases. The argument is only that Congress has the constitutional authority to decide
the question.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as anended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp.
II 1972) [hereinafter cited as Title VII.
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than to a jury.13 Courts have recognized this intent and have held
that Title VII actions for reinstatement and "back pay" (wages the
employee would have earned had the employer not violated the sub-
stantive provisions of the law) do not import the right to jury trial.
14
Several circuits, moreover, have held that virtually identical'3 actions
brought under § 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code' 6 may be
tried only to a judge.'
7
Courts have denied the "right" to a jury trial in several other
statutory schemes, e.g., in actions for unpaid overtime and minimum
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act,'5 for restoration to union
membership and damages resulting from suspension under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,' 9 for damages in actions
alleging housing discrimination brought under Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196820 and for legal and equitable relief under
the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act.2 ' Cases concerning
13. See p. 417 infra.
14. See note 7 supra. See generally Comment, supra note 4.
15. On the similarity between employment discrimination actions brought under
Title VII and those brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), see p. 422 infra.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
17. See cases cited note 7 supra.
18. Under § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) [here-
inafter cited as FLSA], employees may sue their employers for unpaid minimum wages
or unpaid overtime compensation. Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970) the Secretary of
Labor is authorized to bring the same action in behalf of employees. Under 29 U.S.C.
§ 217 (1970) district courts are given jurisdiction to restrain withholding of payments
of minimum wages or overtime compensation in suits brought on behalf of the
employee by the Secretary of Labor. The right to jury trial exists as to suits brought
under § 216(b) and § 216(c), see Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1965),
but there is no jury trial right in actions under § 217. Id. For an attempt to ra-
tionalize this result, see Note, Fair Labor Standards Act and Trial by Jury, 65 COLu..
L. REv. 514 (1965).
19. 29 U.S.C. 412 (1970). Employees may sue for reinstatement and lost wages upon
a suspension resulting from the exercise of rights guaranteed in 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1970),
the Bill of Rights of members of labor organizations. Simmons v. Local 713, Textile
Workers, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965), held the jury trial right exists as to claims
asserted tunder 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970). Contra, McCraw v. Local 43, Plumbers & Pipe-
fitters, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970). Lower courts are split on the jury trial right
question. See note 10 supra.
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), (c) (1970). The question of a right to jury trial under this
statute has apparently not been litigated. I Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335
F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971), there was a jury trial; in Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co.,
320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970), there was not. The issue of a right to jury trial
was not discussed in either case.
Section 626(b), however, decrees that the statute shall be enforced "in accordance
with the powers, remedies, and procedures" of §§ 216 & 217. See note 18 supra. Thus
an age discrimination action analogous to a FLSA action under § 216 or § 217 might
import the same right to jury trial as do actions under those statutes. Section 626(c),
however, provides that an aggrieved party "may bring a civil action in any court of
competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes
of this chapter. ... Should an employee claiming age discrimination bring a § 626(c)
action not analogous to §§ 216 & 217 actions, for instance an action for damages based
on emotional injury, courts can only apply the traditional historical analogies to dis-
cover the existence vel non of the jury trial right. Congress has not assisted courts
by expressing its intent on the question.
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the right to jury trial in actions under these and several now defunct
statutes2 2 constitute a body of doctrine available to courts seeking to
effectuate congressional intentions for nonjury trial in statutory ac-
tions. These cases, however, have for the most part not dealt with
the implications of recent expansive Supreme Court holdings on the
Seventh Amendment.
The Court has recently held 23 that the right to jury trial of a legal
claim cannot be lost because that claim was introduced in a suit after
equitable claims were made or because that claim was of small mag-
nitude in comparison with an equitable claim raised in the same suit.
Thus the claim for back pay damages incurred by discriminatory
breach of an employment contract would appear to be legal in nature
and thus triable by right to a jury,24 regardless of the nature of any
other relief sought by the plaintiff.
Generally, however, three arguments have been developed to limit
the right to jury trial in statutory actions. None is entirely compel-
ling. None applies with equal force to all statutory actions. And none
provides the Supreme Court with a justification for ruling, as it is
presently being asked to do in Rogers v. Loether ;2 5 against a right
to jury trial in Title VIII housing discrimination actions.
22. E.g., The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885. Strelitz
v. Surrey Classics, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), held there was no right to jury
trial in actions for reinstatement and back pay under the Act, but Steffen v. Farmers
Elevator Serv. Co., 109 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Iowa 1952), distinguished Strelitz and granted
jury trial where monetary damages rather than reinstatement were sought.
Another such statute was the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat.
23, authorizing the recovery of rent and price overcharges. See § 205(a) (government
niry seek injunction restraining violations); § 205(e) (individual may sue for S50 or
triple the overcharge; as amended by the Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, 58 Stat.
632, 640-41, the government may undertake this action in behalf of the individual).
In Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), the government suit for res-
titution of rent overcharges to tenants and an injunction restraining further over-
charges was held an equitable action authorized by § 205(a). A private action under
§ 205(e), however, was acknowledged to be cognizable at law. 328 U.S. at 402.
23. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres v. West-
over, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); part II infra.
24. If the action for lost wages ("back pay") is characterized as akin to "special
assumpsit" to recover damages on a simple contract, then the issues raised therein are
triable to a jury on demand. 5 Mooiti's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11[5], at 120 (2d ed.
1971). See also Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (the
same district court that was reversed in Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427
F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971), expatiates on the legal
nature of claims for back pay presented under Title VII; the court holds contrary to
its reasoning, because Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.
1969) is controlling); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 2308, at 46 n.53.
In United States v. Georgia Power Co., 427 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973), the court argued
that civil rights employment discrimination actions should not be considered analogous
to breach of contract suits. The alternative, however, is to consider them analogous to
tort claims. United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147 (3rd Cir. 1971); Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 N.W.U. L. REV.
277 (1965). A tort claim would have been brought in a trespass action in 1791 in a
court of law; thus the right to jury trial exists. 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11
[5], at 118 (2d ed. 1971).
25. 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2770 (1973).
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The first argument postulates that since the statutorily created rights
are "public" and not "private," they are equitable rather than legal. 26
A public right is said to be one in which the people at large are in-
terested. Such a right, it is said, is unlike the purely private rights
asserted by individuals in actions at law; therefore it is equitable.
2 7
This argument, however, cannot be harmonized with the existence
of the jury trial right in causes of action in which the public at large
is vitally interested. 28 The public right argument also misconstrues
the meaning of the term "right" as used by the Court in its interpre-
tations of the Seventh Amendment. 29 Equitable rights have no spe-
cial character other than that they are rights which could not be
asserted at law due to some inadequacy of that forum. Equitable
rights are no more imbued with the public interest than are other
rights recognized by the state and enforced in its courts.30
A variation of the argument is that the Seventh Amendment does
not apply to causes of action created by statute: Where the legislature
does not merely codify but creates the action, it could not have existed
at common law in 1791. Since the Seventh Amendment only preserves
the right to jury trial as it then existed, the argument goes, there is
26. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1965); Culpepper v. Rey-
nolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1239-43 (N.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd on statute of limi-
tations question, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. McCraw v. Local 43, Plumbers & Pipe-
fitters, 341 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1965).
27. But see 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 where "public wrongs" are said
to be a breach of "public rights" and "private wrongs" are an "infringement" of
"private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals." Blackstone,
however, then notes that public wrongs are "distinguished by the harsher appellations
of crimes and misdemeanors" (emphasis in original). A possible implication is that he
believes there is no such thing as a public right which can be asserted in a civil court.
28. For example, in Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909), a suit to collect
a statutory penalty was said to be equivalent to a suit to collect a debt and therefore
triable to a jury, although the right is asserted in the public interest. In Fleitmann
v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916), it was established that there was
a constitutional right to jury trial in antitrtst actions for treble damages under the
Sherman Act, though the public interest was obviously involved.
29. On the importance of the distinction between the right asserted and the form
of action in which it is asserted, see Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)
(Story, J.) (emphasis in original):
By comnmon law, they [the writers of the Seventh Amendment] meant what the
constitution denominated in the third article "law;" not merely suits, which the
commlnon law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which
legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were ad-
ministered ....
30. "A true eqtitable right is always derivative and dependent, i.e., it is derived
from, and dependent upon, a legal right." C. LANCDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQuITY
JURIOICTrON 5 (1905). If Langdell is correct, then equitable rights are not of a dif-
ferent nature than legal rights. They are simply legal rights which remedial and pro-
cedural inadequacies in the courts of law have stultified; these legal rights, unchanged
in nature, are cognizable in equity for want of a legal forum. They are thereafter
labeled equitable rights. The distinction between legal and equitable rights, therefore,
describes only the forum in which these rights may adequately be asserted. See p. 411
infra.
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no right to a jury trial of issues raised in a modern statutory action.31
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.3 2 is cited to support this
argument, but the Court held in that case only that the Seventh
Amendment did not apply to guarantee a jury trial right in "statutory
proceedings," which are distinguishable from statutory actions.3 3 The
clear weight of authority indicates that if CongTess creates an action
without indicating that it be considered equitable, then rights raised
in that action may properly be held triable to a jury if analogous to
rights asserted at law in 1791 in England.3 t1
In the employment discrimination actions, claims for monetary re-
lief are often joined with a request for an injunction compelling
reinstatement in the job from which plaintiff was wrongfully dis-
charged or in which plaintiff would have been placed had the em-
ployer not discriminated.3 5 A second argument against jury trial of
the putatively legal claim for "back pay" rests on its incidental30
nature to the equitable injunctive relief sought. This "equitable
31. See, e.g., McCraw v. Local 43, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 341 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir.
1965).
32. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In this case, which arose upon a petition by the NLRB for
judicial enforcement of one of its orders, respondent launched a broad-based attack
on the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. It based its arguments
in part upon the statute's provision empowering the Board to award back pay after
a wrongful discharge in a proceeding without a jury trial.
33. Though the Court does not carefully distinguish "statutory proceedings" from
causes of action created by statute, the notion of statutory proceedings to which the
Seventh Amendment does not apply is a narrow one. The Court cited only Guthrie
National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528 (1899), which held that the Seventh Amend-
ment did not apply to a statute creating a special tribunal to hear and decide upon
claims, not founded in a legal obligation, against a municipal corporation. See also
Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2770
(1973); Note, Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1267-68 (1971).
34. This principle was recognized as early as Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
433, 447 (1830). See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d at 1114 and citations therein; Culpepper
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 1296 F. Supp. at 1241 and citations therein; 9 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 3, § 2302, at 16.
35. See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971). Mildred Harkless and 11 other teachers at an
all-black school were not re-hired when the school district integrated in 1966. Alleging
that their dismissal was racially motivated, the 12 teachers asked the court to issue
preliminary and permanent injunctions compelling the school board to re-hire them
and to require "defendants to reimburse plaintiffs for all back pay and other allow-
ances which plaintiffs would have received but for their dismissal .... ." They also
sought costs and attorney fees. Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 278
F. Supp. 632, 634 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
36. See Brady v. T.W.A., 196 F. Supp. 504, 507 (D. Del. 1961). In Horton v. Lawrence
County Bd. of Educ., 449 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1971), the court expressed the same idea
by stating that back pay was "integral" to the injunctive relief granted, implying that
the back pay claim did not require separate consideration in determining whether
defendant was entitled to a jury trial. The alternate word choice may also indicate
that the court took back pay per se to be an equitable remedy; this is error. See p. 407
infra.
406
Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial
clean-up" doctrine3" was conclusively rejected in Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. WTood.3" There the Supreme Court held that the issues underlying
a claim for damages must be tried to a jury39 even though the claim
for damages was merely incidental in magnitude to a claim for equi-
table relief, provided law is otherwise adequate to deal with the claim.
Any application of the "equitable clean-up" doctrine after Dairy
Queen would apparently contravene the Court's thinking. 40
Finally, courts which have refused to empanel juries in actions for
back pay have argued that the damages sought are in the nature of
restitution, and that restitution is an equitable remedy.41 The theory
of restitution is that defendant holds ill-gotten gains received from
plaintiff.42 In seeking contract damages, on the other hand, plaintiff
asks to be placed in the position he would have occupied had the
contract been lawfully made and performed. 43 The latter remedy is
based on the expectation interest; the former seeks to restore the
status quo.
The restitution theory is of dubious value in denying jury trial
because the exclusively equitable nature of the remedy is suspect.
Restitution could historically have been sought in an indebitatus
assumpsit action at law, 44 and under the Court's theory of the Seventh
Amendment no right should be considered equitable in nature unless
it cannot be asserted adequately at law. A more serious difficulty with
the restitution argument, however, is that it is logically inapplicable
37. See generally 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 2308, at 42-43; Note, Right to
Trial By Jury in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 3 CONN. L. REV. 564, 572-73 (1971).
But see 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.16[4], at 162.9 n.9 (2d ed. 1971).
38. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
39. Id. at 470-73.
40. See note 37 supra. But ef. Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 414 (5th Cir.
1964).
41. See, e.g., Porter v. Warner, 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (Emergency Price Control Act of
1942); Hodgson v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
42. 5 MOORE'S FEDER AL PRACTIcE r 38.24[2], at 190.5 (2d ed. 1971). For restitution
to be proper, defendant must have received something of value from the plaintiff's
hands. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1107, at 573 n.21 (1964).
43. In a damages claim plaintiff asks to be put "in as good a position as he would
have occupied if there had been full performance." 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1102,
at 548 (1964); 11 S. WILLISrON, A TREALTISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcrs § 1339, at 204 (3d
ed. 1968); 12 id. § 1454, at 2-4 [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON ON CONTRAcTs]. Consistent
with a damages theory, plaintiff might ask for all consequential and reliance damages
such as emotional injury and lost opportunity costs. C. McCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 163, at 635 (1935); 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1361, at 315 n.5; RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 329 & comment a (1932).
14. Corbin contends that restitution could be accomplished at law by an indeb-
itatus assumpsit action. See 5 CoRBIN ON CONTRAcTS § 1103, at 557 (1964, Supp. 1971);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 741 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). If
this remedy is adequate, there is no reason to move the action into equity.
Porter v. Warner, 328 U.S. 395 (1946), intimated that restitution would be an equitable
remedy in the instant circumstances. See also United States v. Cowen's Estate, 91 F.
Supp. 331 (D. Mass. 1950). But see United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1950).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 83: 401, 1973
to actions based on discriminatory discharge.45 In such actions the
plaintiff has no claim for the value of uncompensated labor; he has
passed no quid pro quo; he seeks relief based on what he expected
to earn, rather than on the value of what he has already earned. 4
Finally, the restitution argument is of little value when plaintiff
seeks damages other than lost wages. In a Title VIII housing discrimi-
nation action, for instance, plaintiff may seek actual damages and
punitive damages up to a statutory limit.4 7 The return of a rent
overcharge is arguably a restitution claim, but money compensation
sought for a refusal to rent cannot be so characterized. Nor can the
restitution argument cover plaintiff's claims in an employment dis-
crimination suit for punitive damages, compensation for emotional
distress, or moving expenses. 48 These are claims for damages, properly
tried to a jury,49 unless an alternate rationale can be advanced for
upholding the congressional label.
II
The Supreme Court has expounded its modern view of the Seventh
Amendment in the trilogy of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westove r. °0
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 51 and Ross v. Bernhard.52 In these cases
the Court rejected the notion that the application of the Seventh
45. For example, under Title VII, see Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F.
Supp. 1232 (N.D. La. 1969), rev'd on question of statute of limitations, 421 F.2d 888
(5th Cir. 1970).
46. The expectation nature of the so-called "back pay" claim is emphasized by the
fact that back pay awards are reduced by the amounts earned in alternate employment
undertaken after dismissal. See, e.g., McBeth v. Board of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1270 (E.D.
Ark. 1969).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
48. See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 2200 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (court
awarded $4,250,000 in punitive damages); Williams v. Albemarle City Bd. of Educ.,
5 E.P.D. 8592 (M.D.N.C. 1973) (court granted damages for moving expenses, job-
finding expenses, loss of salary, costs, and attorney's fees), aff'd in part, vacated on
the issue of mitigation of damages and remanded, 6 E.P.D. 8870 (4th Cir. 1973);
Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 5 E.P.D. 8501 (W.D. Tex. 1973); cf.
Wall v..Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Lucia v. Duggan,
303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969).
49. Many courts believe jury trial is unsuited for civil rights actions. See, e.g.,
Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Hayes v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49, 53 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
Commentators and at least one court, on the other hand, have observed that the
rationalia used to deny jury trial in § 1983 and Title VII "back pay" actions have
not been thoroughly convincing. See Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914 passim
(S.D. Tex. 1972); Davidson, "Back Pay" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 26 RtrrarRs L. REV. 741, 772-73 (1973); Comment, supra note 4. at 180;
Note, Right to Jury Trial in Section 1983 Damage Actions, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 406
(1973).
50. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
51. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
52. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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Amendment compels categorization of rights and remedies as legal
or equitable on a basis rigidly historical. 3
The Court has held in effect that procedural developments such
as the 1938 merger of law and equity54 have narrowed the sphere of
law's inadequacy and thus expanded the right to civil jury trial.55 In
Beacon Theatres defendant asserted a counterclaim to a suit for a
declaratory judgment and an injunction.o The equitable nature of
the issues raised in the complaint would have warranted a chancellor
in 1791 in enjoining prosecution of the damages claims pending
resolution of the equitable suit.7 This would have greatly curtailed
the right to jury trial, since many of the underlying factual issues
determined in the equitable proceeding would be entitled to res
judicata effect in a later trial on the legal claims. Even after the 1938
merger of law and equity the trial judge had great discretion in de-
termining the order of the trial of the issues. s The Court noted,
however, that in the merged system a jury could be empaneled to
try legal claims no matter when they were raised in the course of a
jury trial.59 Law's new-found post-merger adequacy thus provided the
right to jury trial of the legal claims asserted by the defendant in
Beacon Theatres.
In Dairy Queen'0 plaintiff sought an injunction restraining an
alleged patent infringement and an accounting of profits lost through
the infringement. The injunction was of course equitable in nature;0 '
the accounting was historically either an equitable remedy 2 or a legal
remedy which the chancellor might award as incidental to any equi-
table relief granted. 3 The Court held that neither the equitable label
53. See also Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943). ("[T]he Amend-
ment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most
fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
55. "It was settled in Beacon Theatres that procedural changes which remove in-
adequacy of a remedy at law may sharply diminish the scope of traditional equitable
remedies by making them unnecessary in many cases." Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469, 478 n.19 (1962).
"Since in the federal courts equity has always acted only when legal remedies were
inadequate, the expansion of adequate legal remedies provided by the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Federal Rules necessarily affects the scope of equity." Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959).
See McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 1, 12-13 (1967).
56. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 502-03 (1958).
57. 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcricE 38.11 [p-2], at 128.9 (2d ed. 1971).
58. Id. See also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864, 878 (9th Cir. 1958).
59. 359 U.S. 500, 508-11 (1959).
60. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
61. See 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.24[l], at 190 (2d ed. 1971).
62. 5 id. 38.25, at 198; Belsheim, The Old Action of Account, 45 HARV. L. REv.
466 (1932)o E63. 5 LORE S FEDERAL PRAaricE 38.25, at 198 (2d ed. 1971).
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of the relief sought nor the small magnitude of the monetary claim
could prevent jury trial upon demand of what amounted to a legal
claim for damages.6 4 Law therefore was considered adequate to try
that claim.
In Ross v. Bernhard65 the Court disposed of another procedural
obstacle to law's jurisdiction. Ross was a shareholder's derivative suit
alleging that a third party controlled the corporation through an il-
legally large representation on the board of directors and used that
control to the corporation's detriment. The Court noted that such
a suit, despite its traditionally equitable nature, involved both the
plaintiff's right to sue on the corporation's behalf00 and the merits of
the underlying claim which could often be, as it was in Ross, legal
in nature. The Court held that the right to jury trial existed as to the
issues raised by the underlying corporate claim, since "after the adop-
tion of the [Federal] Rules [of Civil Procedure] there is no longer
any procedural obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before juries,
however the party may have acquired standing to assert the rights.
06 7
Trying the legal issues to a jury would no longer subject the parties
to the awkwardness of litigation in two separate forums as it would
have before merger.
While these cases hold that procedural obstacles will no longer
stand in the way of jury trial, they do not clearly resolve the matter
of what precisely are "legal" issues. On this point the Court indicated
in a footnote in Ross:
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is deter-
mined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference
to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the
practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the
first, requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry,
is obviously the most difficult to apply. 8
64. 369 U.S. at 469, 473-79.
65. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
66. Id. at 534-35.
67. Id. at 547.
68. Id. at 538 n.10.
The Ross footnote test was applied in the following cases: Farmers-Peoples Bank v.
United States, 477 F.2d 752, 756-57 (6th Cir. 1973); Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110,
1118 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2770 (1973); Dawson v. Contractors Corp.,
467 F.2d 727, 734, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Fahy, J., dissenting). By "issue" the Court
apparently meant those questions of fact underlying the claims or rights asserted by
litigants. For the purposes of applying the Seventh Amendment the terms issue, claim,
and right seem interchangeable. "Claim" and "issue" are used interchangeably by Justice
White for the Court in Ross, 396 U.S. at 537-38. Justice Stewart, in dissent, id. at 543,
interchanges "right" and "claim," id. at 545. Conceptually, one can regard an alleged
"right" as the basis of a "claim" which raises fact "issues."
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These three criteria taken together with Beacon and Dairy Queen
suggest that the Amendment distinguishes between law and equity
according to the fundamental principle underlying the evolution of
the bifurcated English judicial system: that equity would take juris-
diction where a litigant could not adequately assert his right at law. 9
Each of the three prongs of the Ross test manifests a distinct aspect
of the principle of inadequacy. First, law is considered inadequate
if no common law writ by which the claim can be asserted is avail-
able. The Court goes out of its way to cast doubt upon the present
utility of this part of the Ross test. The narrowness of the ancient
common law forms of action no longer confines fhe court in fashioning
relief, as the Court noted in Dairy Queen.7 0 The second prong em-
bodies the recognition that law's inadequacy might be remedial: In-
junctions are available only in equity.7 ' This remedial test has become
the prime working criterion for courts ruling on a motion for jury
trial.7 -" Finally, law may be inadequate because of its procedures. The
third Ross test draws attention to the primary modern source of pro-
cedural inadequacy at law, jury trial.
The lineage of the third part of the Ross test is long and distin-
guished. Equity historically took jurisdiction upon allegations of a
wide variety of procedural inadequacies of law courts.7 3 Law was
once inadequate for instance because of rules against multifarious ac-
tions, 74 or because of law's limited provision for discovery.7 5
Many of law's historically recognized procedural inadequacies, how-
ever, have been overcome by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
69. C. LANGDELL, supra note 30, at 252-53; 1 G. SPECE, EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 419
(1846). Billson notes that inadequacy was considered purely procedural by most com-
mentators, but he argues that equity may have an ethical quality distinct from law.
H. BILLSON, EQUITY IN ITS RELATIONS To COMMON LAW 1-14 (1917). Any possible
philosophical distinction was not, in theory at least, a source of conflict between law
and early equity. See S.F.C. MILsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
84-85 (1960).
In American practice an allegation of an inadequate remedy at law has always
been necessary before equity could take jurisdiction. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469, 478 (1962); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 110 (1891); Thompson v. Railroad
Companies, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1867); 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISDICTION
§§ 217-18, at 367 passim (1941).
70. 369 U.S. at 477-79. See also Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963).
71. See note 61 supra.
72. See, e.g., National Life Ins. Co. v. Silverman, 454 F.2d 899, aff'd on rehearing en
banc, 454 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
73. J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADING § 473, at 480-81 (3d ed. 1843).
74. In Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253 (1855), the Supreme Court accepted
appellees' contention that this rule in a court of law would force them to bring as
beparate suits a multi-plaintiff action which could be brought in a single bill in equity;
this severance would render the remedy "uncertain," Summary of appellees' argument,
id. at 254-55, and thus law was inadequate.
75. J. STOR, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 67, at 65 (8th ed. 1861).
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and the merger of law and equity. But one such failing has not been
mitigated by merger. As the Court indicated in Dairy Queen and in
the Ross footnote, the inadequacy of jury trial may still provide
grounds for holding a suit equitable.
In those two cases the alleged inadequacy of juries was their po-
tential inability to understand complex fact questions. Such an inade-
quacy was not an allegation employed in 1791 to throw a suit into
equity, but in calling attention to it the Court illustrates that the
inadequacy principle is not merely a broken fragment of forgotten
forms of pleading but the vital idea incorporated in the Seventh
Amendment.
In its modem application of the Seventh Amendment, the Court
has found that procedural developments have operated to narrow
the realm in which law is inadequate. Changing circumstances, how-
ever, may operate to broaden it as well. An action may be deemed
equitable where legal writs, legal remedies, or legal procedures, in-
cluding jury trial, have become inadequate to render justice.
Nevertheless, the "abilities and limitations" clause has troubled
commentators by its vagueness and seemingly unlimited potential for
judicial tinkering7 8 with the jury trial right. Finding the "abilities
and limitations" clause opaque, they have in effect suggested that it
be ignored.71 The Court itself has not yet explicitly indicated the
importance or means of applying the third part of the Ross test. But
76. Ross holds that "purely procedural impediments to the presentation of any issue
by any party, based on a difference between law and equity, were destroyed" by the
writing of the Federal Rules. 396 U.S. at 539-40.
Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478 n.19, and Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509, indicate
that law's historic remedial inadequacies have been reduced by modern changes in pro-
cedure. Arguably, the only modern remedial inadequacy of law is that forum's inability
to grant injunctions. The only modem procedural inadequacy is the "abilities and limi-
tations" of trial by jury.
77. For an early expression of the propriety of a mutable right to civil jury trial,
see THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 530 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton):
The best judges of the matter will be the least anxious for a constitutional estab-
lishment of the trial by jury in civil cases, and will be the most ready to admit that
the changes which are continually happening in the affairs of society may render
a different mode of determining questions of property preferable in many cases in
which that mode now prevails.
A court has recently betrayed a similar concern over a rigid nonfunctional applica-
tion of the Seventh Amendment. See Gefen v. United States, 400 F.2d 476, 479 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1119 (1969).
In fact equity jurisdiction has frequently grown at the expense of the common law.
F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.2, at 341 (1965).
78. One court has evidenced a reluctance to commence such tinkering. "If the scope
of equitable accounting is to be expanded to encompass cases felt to be too complex
or esoteric for trial to a jury, we think that expansion must come from the Supreme
Court." And in a footnote the court opines that such an expansion is not likely. Tights,
Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 341 & n.l 1 (4th Cir. 1971).
79. Note, supra note 5, at 129-33. Cf. Note, supra note 49, at 415-16; Note, supra
note 10, at 618-19.
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in Katchen v. Landy,80 decided four years before Ross, the Court fore-
shadowed, albeit inarticulately, the principle of jury inadequacy, under
which a "legal" claim might be deemed to be equitable. Furthermore,
the Court indicated the circumstances in which the principle of jury
inadequacy might be invoked as a grounds for equitable jurisdiction:
When Congress indicates in legislation which creates a statutory
cause of action that the suit should be tried without a jury, courts
should accede to that declaration. This congressional indication of
inadequacy is the concept by which the third prong of the Ross test
gains content and utility.
III
In Katchen v. Landy8' a bankruptcy trustee asserted and proved
voidable preferences8 2 in response to a claim filed by the creditor
who received the preferences. The issue before the Court was whether
the bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction under § 2a(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act8 3 to order the surrender of the preferences without
a jury trial, and if so, whether this was unconstitutional. Petitioner's
constitutional argument was based on the fact that absent the filing
of a claim by the holder of an alleged preference, the return of a
preference would require the trustee to initiate a plenary action in
which the jury trial right would inhere, since such an action is analo-
gous to a legal claim for debt.8 4 To deprive him of this right, petitioner
argued, merely because he had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court by filing a claim, would contravene the Court's
holding in Beacon. The Court there had stated that since merger
had obviated the procedural awkwardness of litigating in two forums,
80. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
81. Id.
82. A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property of
a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent
debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months
before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under
this Act, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
Section 60a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(2) (1970) accords the bankruptcy court power to allow and
disallow claims in a summary proceeding. Section 57g of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93(g)
(1970), permits the trustee to object to the allowance of a claim in such a proceeding
on grounds that the claimant has received a preference. In passing upon an objection
the court must determine the amount of the preference, a determination which would
ordinarily be made by a jury if the trustee had sought to recover the preference in
a plenary action under § 60b, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970). Since the normal rules of res
judicata apply, however, the bankruptcy court's summary adjudication of the preference
issue raised by the trustee's objection under § 57g will operate to deprive the claimant
of his jury trial right on that issue.
84. 382 U.S. at 327-28.
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the right to jury trial of legal issues could no longer be lost through
prior determination of equitable claims having res judicata effect.
The Court disagreed. Noting that it had reserved the possibility in
Beacon and Dairy Queen that there might be situations in which it
would permit equitable proceedings to foreclose a jury trial right,s5
the Court held that the Seventh Amendment did not guarantee a
right to jury trial in the circumstances. Great stress was laid upon the
congressional indication:
In neither Beacon Theatres nor Dairy Queen was there involved
a specific statutory scheme contemplating the prompt trial of a
disputed claim without the intervention of a jury. We think
Congress intended the trustee's § 57g objection to be summarily
determined; and to say that because the trustee could bring an
independent suit against the creditor to recover his voidable pref-
erence, he is not entitled to have his statutory objection to the
claim tried in the bankruptcy court in the normal manner is to
dismember a scheme which Congress has prescribed.80
The fact that the Bankruptcy Act is administered in bankruptcy
courts which have traditionally been considered courts of equity"7
does not diminish the importance of the Katchen decision. Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides for nonjury trial of damage
claims which, though legal in nature, might historically have been
awarded by an equity court as incidental to the equitable remedy of
reinstatement. Dairy Queen would seem to mandate a revision of the
historical pattern. And Beacon Theatres would also seem to mandate
a jury trial of a claim traditionally subsumed in the equitable nature
of the Bankruptcy Court. But though Beacon and Dairy Queen un-
dermined the traditional bases of equity jurisdiction, the Court ac-
knowledged in Katchen that the existence of a specific statutory scheme
might suffice to protect prior practice from the effects of the Court's
expansion of the jury trial right.
In view of Katchen's emphasis on the significance of the congres-
sional schemes8 it is not surprising that the Court has never rejected
85. Id. at 339-40.
86. Id. at 339.
87. See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
88. 382 U.S. at 330-36.
Another case in which the Court acceded to a congressional designation was Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). In Glidden the Court faced a congressional declara-
tion that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were both
Article III courts. No strong policy militated against this labeling, save for stare
decisis: The Supreme Court had previously held they were Article I courts. In over-
ruling the precedent, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, seemed to regard the
414
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a congTessional indication that an action is equitable in nature.8 9
Most lower courts, with the Seventh Circuit in Rogers90 an exception,
have followed this lead."' Congressional characterization of statutory
actions as equitable is properly regarded as the means for courts to
invoke the third part of the Ross test to hold that rights which can-
not be adequately asserted before a jury are thus equitable in nature.
In other words, the congressional declaration has the force of a judicial
ruling 2 on jury inadequacy, which as the Court has explained, is
part of the meaning of the Seventh Amendment.93
Courts ought to leave the burden of determining the inadequacy
congressional declaration as, first, a stimulus for reevaluation of the Court's posture
on the issue, and, second, an answer to the question before the Court. If the Court
of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had the characteristics of
Article III courts and if, as Congress now indicated, they are intended to be Article
III courts, the majority opinion seemed to say, then they must be, and always have
been, Article III courts.
In effect the Glidden majority considered the congressional label for the two courts
as presumptively correct. The Court expressed this presumption obliquely. The Justices
reconsidered the Court's earlier decision and decided that congressional intent plus the
general nature of modern practice in the two courts dictated that they might well
be considered Article III courts. And so, prospectively and retrospectively, they were
to be considered such.
89. In other holdings that a variety of claims are equitable, one may perceive the
importance of congressional intent. For instance, in Porter v. Warner, 328 U.S. 395,
397-98 (1946), the Court found broad equitable power to be granted by Congress to
courts in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23; the powers
were necessarily broad, the Court seemed to say, in order to effectuate completely the
purposes of the Act.
In Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960), the Court held that an
equitable action for reinstatement of a dismissed employee brought on the employee's
behalf by the Secretary of Labor under § 17 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970), could
properly include as equitable a claim for lost wages. Congress had amended the Act
to remove from the section's coverage claims for unpaid overtime and minimum wages,
restricting these claims to actions initiated by the employee himself under § 16(b). The
Court held that claims for unpaid overtime wages were distinct from the claim asserted
for wages lost by wrongful discharge and that the legislative amendment had not
stripped an equity court of the power to award the latter.
The Court justified its treatment of the back pay claim as equitable and therefore
within the scope of § 17 by an appeal to the historic power of equity to provide
complete relief in light of the statutory purposes. Reference is made to inherent equi-
table powers. This may indicate a characterization of the claim as restitutive or inci-
dental to injunctive relief also sought. (De Mario Jewelry was decided two years before
Dairy Queen apparently curtailed equity "clean-up" jurisdiction.) However, the case is
also consistent with the theory that equitable jurisdiction may be predicated on a
congressional indication that jury trial is inappropriate. Congress must have been
aware when it amended the statute that § 17 had long been interpreted to authorize
the award of back pay; its failure to withdraw that authorization in narrowing the
scope of an obviously equitable section might be read as a declaration !hat jury trial
was inappropriate for the back pay remedy.
90. 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2770 (1973).
91. The major example is the judicial response to congressional desire for nonjury
trial under Title VII. See note 7 supra.
92. This is the second of the four ways in which, Roscoe Pound argued, common
law courts might approach legislative material. Pound, Common Law and Legislation,
21 HvRv. L. REv. 383, 385 (1908). See Note, The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in
the Common Law: Justice Harlan's Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258, 266-69 (1972).
93. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 n.19 (1962); Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959). See also p. 408 supra.
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of jury trial to Congress. Congress is the branch of government best
suited to undertake investigative functions9 4 necessary to determine
the adequacy or inadequacy of trial by jury in a newly created statu-
tory cause of action. More important, it is likely that no scientific
conclusion can be reached on the matter.95 Any decision on the ade-
quacy of jury trial ought to be the result of an openly political con-
sensus, and only Congress can arrive at such a consensus. In Katchen,
the only post-1938 case where the Court recognized a legal inadequacy
of the sort enunciated four years later in the third criterion of the
Ross test, the Court placed great emphasis on the existence of a
statutory scheme.
A court would of course need some clear sign from Congress be-
fore proceeding to limit the right to jury trial in any way. In many
instances the language of the statute will provide a clear indication
of congressional intent. For instance, "the court" may be given the
power to "restrain" violations of the statute.96 By this language in
§ 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act97 Congress described relief in
the nature of an injunction; since the relief is equitable, nonjury
trial is dictated. 98
In some statutes the language does not so clearly prescribe equity
trial. Under § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,99 for instance,
Congress established a cause of action to be brought by an employee
for unpaid minimum wages and overtime pay. Under this statute, the
"court ... in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff" was
to "allow a reasonable attorney's fee." The use of the word "court"
in this context, with no indication that the court ought to shape an
equitable remedy, cannot justify a ruling that Congress intended
nonjury trial. Courts have quite properly held that the judge's re-
sponsibility under this provision is restricted to the award of attor-
94. See Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495,
508 (1908).
95. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROcEDURE 378 (1965).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970): "The district courts . . .shall have jurisdiction, for cause
shown, to restrain violations of section 215 of this title, including . . . the restraint
of any withholding of payment of minimum wages or overtime compensation.
97. 52 Stat. 1059, 1069 (1938), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
98. See Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1965). See generally Note, supra note
18. The author concludes that jury trial should "be afforded on the factual issues raised
by the claim for unpaid wages" in an action under § 217, id. at 529. This conclusion is
dictated by the standard modem reading of the Seventh Amendment, but according
to this Note the "inadequacy principle" as invoked by expressed congressional intent to
have nonjury trial authorizes equity trial for § 217 actions.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). Section 216(c) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to
bring actions such as those authorized in § 216(b) on behalf of an employee.
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ney's fees and does not include the award of the money judgment
contemplated by the statute.100
In Titles VII 1 1 and VIII, 102 however, the use of the phrase "the
court" indicates that Congress contemplated only nonjury trial.10 3
The latter statute provides in a single sentence that "the court" may
grant injunctive relief and actual and punitive damages.10 4 Since it
would be extraordinary for Congress to make injunctive relief avail-
able in a jury trial, and extremely unlikely that the meaning of the
word "court" would change in the midst of the sentence, it must be
assumed that it was used throughout to distinguish judge from a jury.
Doubt as to this conclusion might be resolved by reference to the
legislative history. 0° It may be expected that as Congress becomes
aware of its power to denominate actions equitable or legal it will
take greater care in expressing its preferences clearly.
Of course, any congressional characterization of a statutory action
as equitable would at a minimum have to meet the criterion of
rationality, 00 but this would undoubtedly prove a minor hurdle. The
courts might also accept congressional determination of jury inade-
quacy only where there is possible juror bias against minority groups.
Such a limitation is not wholly unprincipled. It- would authorize
Congress to limit jury trial in furtherance of the fundamental values
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment while denying it the power
to curtail the right for purposes of lesser constitutional stature.
This limitation, however, does not withstand analysis. First, the
Katchen case is an instance of judicial acquiescence to a congressional
label founded upon the inefficiency of jury trial rather than its pos-
100. See Lewis v. Times Pub. Co., 185 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1950); Olearchick v. American
Steel Foundries, 73 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.
(West Supp. 1973).
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
103. As to Title VII, see Comment, supra note 4, at 169-71. As to Title VIII, see
Brief for Petitioner at 19-24, Rogers v. Loether, cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2770 (1973)
(Sup. Ct. docket no. 72-1035).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
105. The legislative histories of both civil rights statutes indicate that nonjury trial
was thought necessary to ensure achievement of the purposes of the legislation. As to
Title VII, see Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1239 & n.5 (N.D.
Ga. 1969), rev'd on question of statute of limitations, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970);
see also note 113 infra.
As to Title VIII, see Brief for Petitioner at 10 passim, Rogers v. Loether, cert. granted,
93 S. Ct. 2770 (1973) (Sup. Ct. docket no. 72-1035); see also note 113 infra.
The legislative history of § 16 of the -FLSA by contrast does not reveal the same
concerns. Cf. Note, supra note 18, at 514-16.
106. Legislation purporting to find jury trial inadequate in all actions filed on even-
numbered dates would be an example of a congressional determination which failed to
meet the test of rationality.
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sibilities for juror bias.'07 In addition such an ad hoc limitation seems
indefensible if the Seventh Amendment is to be regarded as expressing
the flexible principle of equitable jurisdiction: Inadequacy can mani-
fest itself at different times in different ways.
An alternate limitation upon the congressional power to determine
jury inadequacy would be that the legislative mandate for nonjury
trial would not be permitted to curtail the jury trial right in actions
belonging to a "common law core," that is, those actions unmistakably
cognizable in common law courts in 1791 in England. Civil rights
actions, although they can be analogized to certain common law actions
existing in 1791,108 are not themselves part of this core and could be
held equitable upon the strength of the congressional intent; the
traditional requirement that newly created causes of action be analo-
gized to their common law antecedents would be disregarded in the
face of a positive congressional designation. But Congress would not
have the power to enact a statute which merely labeled as equitable,
for example, simple trespass actions for damages brought in federal
courts under diversity jurisdiction.'09 Such common law core actions
would be immutably fixed in their legal characterization.
Such a limitation would render the inadequacy principle a much
less radical interpretation of the Seventh Amendment. In addition
it would confine the principle to areas in which it has already been
applied. After all, Congress has never attempted to abolish the right
to jury trial in an action which existed as long ago as 1791, and thus
the courts have never been called upon to sanction such a step.
On the other hand, this distinction between post-1791 actions and
a common law core, in which Congress would be forbidden to tamper
with traditional jury trial rights, might prove upon closer inspection
to be more illusory than real, and it might involve the courts in the
kind of arcane historical inquiry which the Court viewed with evident
disfavor in Ross." 0
107. See p. 413 supra.
108. See Kastner v. Brackett, 326 F. Supp. 1151, 1152 (D. Nev. 1971), where the court
likened a damages action under Title VIII to assumpsit and to deceit, both being ac-
tions at law.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
110. A rigorously logical application of the inadequacy principle would seemingly
demand that no limitation be placed upon its scope. Such an interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment would no more amount to an unwarranted judicial supineness in
the face of the congressional will than does the present limited judicial review of con-
gressional exercises of power under the Commerce Clause, and the considerations fa-
voring the abolishment of civil jury trial may soon be as strong as those which have
induced the far-reaching congressional exercise of Commerce Clause powers. For dis-
cussion of some drawbacks to jury trial, see, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TIAL 10845
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IV
When applied to claims asserted under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Title VIII of the 1968 Act, this concept of conform-
ance to congressional characterizations of actions as legal or equitable
requires the conclusion that jury trials are inadequate in suits brought
under those statutes. Both statutes on their faces indicate that Con-
gress did not contemplate jury trials in suits brought under their
provisions; the language specifies that "the court" may grant appro-
priate relief.' The respective legislative histories also reveal that
Congress determined that jury trial was inadequate in these actions. 1 2
These legislative judgments easily meet the test of rationality. Congress
was concerned that juror bias might frustrate the enforcement of the
substantive rights conferred by the acts."3 No evidence exists to show
(1950); J. FPtNr, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 170-85, 302-09 (1935); H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); Note, supra note 5, at 123-26.
England has drastically curtailed the jury trial right without any notable negative
effects. In 1972, out of 1,129 trial actions before the Queen's Bench, jury trial was
had in only 23. CIVIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS FOR THE YEAR 1972, at 37, Table 8 (1973).
For a cogent argument illuminating the importance of jury trial in shaping sound
substantive law, however, see S.F.C. MILo, supra note 69, at 69-80.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II 1972): "If the court finds that the respondent
has intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment practice . . . the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may inclnde, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."
See also Comment, supra note 4, at 169-71.
Section 812(c) of Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) provides: "The Court may grant
as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary
restraining order, or other order, and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and
not more than S1000 punitive damages, together with court costs and reasonable at-
torney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff .... ." See Brief for Petitioner at 10,
Rogers v. Loether, cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2770 (1973) (Sup. Ct. docket no. 72-1035).
112. See 110 CONG. Ric. 7255 (1964) (Title VII). As to Title VIII the legislative in-
tent is not quite as clear. An earlier version of Title VIII, not enacted by Congress,
provided like the present statute that damages could be awarded by "the court." S. 5296
§ 406(c), 89th Cong., 2d Sess.; 112 CONG. Rac. 9397 (1966). At the hearings on the bill
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach told Senator Sam Ervin that "I assume if there
was a suit here that was for purely damages that the court would use a jury." Katzen-
bach was apparently referring to advisory juries. Senator Ervin asked the Attorney
General if he would object to an amendment spelling out the right to jury trial of
issues of fact underlying a damages claim under Title VIII. But no such amendment
was passed. Hearings on S. 3296 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1178 (1966).
113. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 8660 (Remarks of Senator Morse), 9819 (Remarks of
Senator Javits), 12958 (Remarks of Senator Humphrey) (1964).
Combined hearings on Title VIII and the Jury Selection and Service Act included
testimony regarding the refusal of southern juries to find against white defendants
in civil rights cases. See Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm.,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1183 (Remarks of Attorney General Katzenbach), 1521 (Remarks
of Congressman Ryan), 1331 (Remarks of Congressman Diggs), 1515 (Remarks of Whitney
Young) (1966). The congressional concern over the problem of enforcing civil rights
legislation by jury trial is comprehensively discussed in Brief for Petitioner at 19-24,
Rogers v. Loether, cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 2770 (1973) (Sup. Ct. docket no. 72-1035).
See, e.g., Hearings, supra at 1509-10.
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that this fear was an irrational one. In fact jury bias was one ancient
reason for the rise of equity. 114 In the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies115 plaintiffs were able to resort to chancery by alleging jury
bias as the reason that law was not adequate to give them relief.110
As time went on the law courts developed their own measures such
as the attaint jury" 7 and the grant of a new trialils to combat jury
bias."19 These remedies may not have ensured law's adequacy; as late
as 1674 a common law judge is heard complaining that the losing
party in an action decided against the weight of evidence will repeat
the action again in an equitable court. 20 By 1791, however, jury bias
was apparently overcome by legal rather than equitable means.' 2 '
Of course litigants have long cast their actions in equitable form
in order to avoid jury trial. Yet fewer allegations of law's inadequacy
survive to prevent jury trial.'2 2 Even as plaintiffs find themselves less
able to avoid jury trial, however, they may also find the historic
remedies for jury bias to be less effective. With respect to civil rights
actions, at any rate, jury bias might inevitably hamper the pursuit
of justice, no matter how many new trials were granted.
23
114. Chancery originally was the source of writs granted to the other royal courts.
For reasons not entirely clear, it gradually developed its own jurisdiction. See generally
S.F.C. MILsOM, supra note 69, at 74-87.
115. Saxby v. Laurence, 1 Cal. xxxii (15th C.) (plaintiff unable to obtain common
law remedy because defendant, who had thrown down plaintiff's house, was the in-
fluential and powerful under-sheriff of the city of Norwich); George v. Reyneford, I
Cal. lxxxiii (15th C.) (defendant prays that cause be removed to chancery because
plaintiff in trespass action had "grete knowlage and favor in the citie," while de-
fendant was but "a straungier"); Abbot v. Stanley, 1 Cal. xxxiii (15th C.) (bill com-
plaining that defendant refused for 21 years to pay rent for certain premises held by
her of plaintiffs', and assaulted and threatened those who came to demand it; on
account of defendant's powerful connections-she was the prioress of a convent-plain-
tiffs alleged they had no remedy at common law); Bowman v. Fote, 1 Cal. ci (15th
C.) (defendant in trespass action seeks an equitable remedy because he was a stranger
in London where the plaintiff was well-known, and no attaint was available there);
Scadewell v. Stormesworth, 1 Cal. v. (14th C.) (plaintiff seeks to have cause transferred
to equity because defendant boasted that "il avroit chare de pardon en despit de ses
enemyes"); see D.M. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT OF CHANCERY 70-73 (1890); S.F.C. MILsoMi, supra note 69. at 77.
116. This bias does not appear to have been racial, of course; law was inadequate,
for instance, because the jury would be intimidated by the defendant's role in the
community and would not give testimony or decide facts against defendant. See S.F.C.
MILsOm, supra note 69, at 77.
117. J. B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT TIIE COMM.ON LAW
(PART I: DEVELOPMENT OF TRIAL BY JURY) 140 (1896).
118. F. BULLER, TRIALS AT Nisi PRIUS 326-27 (1785).
119. Two early actions were created by statute evidently to achieve the same pur-
pose. The first, in 1433, allowed damages against perjuring jurors. St. 11 Henry 6, c.
4. The second, in 1436, increased the property qualifications of attaint jurors. St. 15
Henry 6, c. 5.
The Star Chamber was also used for punishing perjuring jurors. S.F.C. MILSOM, supra
note 69, at 366; J.B. THAYER, supra note 117, at 162-63.
120. See Martyn and Jackson, 3 Keble 398 (1674).
121. See F. BULLER, supra note 118.
122. See p. 409 supra.
123. On juror bias as grounds for a new trial see 6A Mooi's FDEDAL PRACTICE
59.08[4], at 59-124 (2d ed. 1973).
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A further effect of the principle of inadequacy as determined by
Congress is that the legislature would be able to expand the remedies
presently permitted under Title VII to include all forms of appar-
ently legal relief without importing the jury trial right. Since Congress
might determine that a plaintiff could not receive an adequate hearing
at law, any claim might be heard by a judge sitting as an equity
chancellor. Recognition of the principle would also effectuate the
congressional intent in any other statutory scheme where jury trial
may threaten to thwart legitimate legislative goals .124
While the principle of congressionally determined inadequacy re-
solves the jury trial issue as to the modern statutory civil rights actions,
it does not conclusively resolve the same question posed by statutes
such as § 1983.12 The language of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, un-
like its modern relations, does not express a congressional intent that
the suits it authorizes be tried in equity. The language shows in fact
that both court and jury trials were contemplated. 12
6
On the other hand, the likelihood of jury bias is no less in § 1983
employment or housing discrimination suits than under analogous
actions brought under Title VII or Title VIII. The legislative history
of § 1983 does show some congressional apprehension that the sub-
stantive rights conferred by the statute would prove unenforceable
because of jury bias.' 27 Moreover, it would be anomalous for a court
denying a motion for jury trial in one of the modem civil rights
actions to grant the same motion in the identical suit brought under
§ 1983.128 The courts' characterization of these suits as equitable can
124. The argument in this Note is that the inadequacy principle is the soundest
rationale for holding as equitable all statutory actions which Congress declared ap-
propriate for nonjury trial. The principle may be said to sanction the equity appella-
tion for actions brought under the following statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) (hous-
ing discrimination); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq. (West Supp. 1973) (employment dis-
crimination); 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970) (violation of Fair Labor Standards Act prosecuted
by Secretary of Labor); 11 U.S.C. § 1l(a)(2) (1970) (Bankruptcy Act).
125. Courts of appeal have held that in a § 1983 employment discrimination action
for reinstatement and back pay there is no right to a jury trial. See note 7 supra.
But § 1983 damage actions generally import the jury trial right. See Note, supra note
10, at 630.31.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides for liability "in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
127. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871), cited in Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 177 (1961).
128. The 1972 amendments to Title VII brought within its reach public school
teachers and other employees of local governmental bodies and potentially eliminated
suits for discriminatory employment practices brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983
(1970).
The Court, moreover, has held in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 93 S. Ct. 2222 (1973),
that a city may not be sued under § 1983, because it is not a "person." This holding
might conceivably be extended to ban suits under § 1983 against municipal entities
such as school boards.
On the other hand, school teacher plaintiffs, for instance, may still sue school board
members as individuals; City of Kenosha might mean only that damages cannot be
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be preserved if a congressional indication that a suit be considered
equitable is treated as having the precedential effect of a judge-made
rule. As such, it may be a source of analogy, as is a judge-made rule, 2
for a court seeking to harmonize the application of the Seventh Amend-
ment to actions which are almost identical.1
30
Identity between actions under Title VII and Title VIII and simi-
lar actions brought under § 1983131 may be established, conveniently,
by reference to the same three factors which the Ross footnote offers
as the test of the legal nature of issues: the type of fact questions pre-
sented, the remedies asked, and the abilities and limitations of juries.
The first factor is obviously the same in both types of actions; the
second can be the same if § 1983 plaintiffs limit their claims to the
remedies authorized by Congress in Title VII and Title VIII and do
not make other claims for relief; and the third is identical since the
consideration of jury bias is as relevant to § 1983 plaintiffs as to Title
VII and Title VIII plaintiffs.
This analogy is intentionally strict; the policies against judicial in-
won from the public fisc under § 1983. Cf. generally Note, Vicarious Liability Under
Section 1983, 6 IND. L. REV. 509 (1973). Furthermore, City of Kenosha may have no
effect on § 1981 actions, since the word "person" does not appear in that statute.
The use of §§ 1981 & 1983 to institute employment discrimination suits is also
limited by a line of cases holding that plaintiffs must invoke and exhaust Title VII
EEOC proceedings before initiating actions under any other statute. Waters v. Wis-
consin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Kinsey
v. Legg, Mason & Co., 6 E.P.D. 8708 (D.D.C. 1973). But a contrary line holds that
the early civil rights actions provide a proper independent cause of action. Hill v.
American Airlines, 6 E.P.D. 8703 (5th Cir. 1973); Young v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co.,
438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). On the difficulties with EEOC proceedings, see generally
Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972); Developments in the Law-Employment Dis-
crimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971).
Another reason why an action may be brought under §§ 1981 & 1983 but not Title
VII is an apparent statute of limitations difference. The old civil rights actions are
limited by the analogous state limit for damages claims. See, e.g., Sitwill v. Burnette, 5
E.P.D. 8435 (W.D. Va. 1972) (limit of two years). Title VII putatively carries a
tolling period of 180 days. This limitation was extended, however, in United States
v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 922-24 (5th Cir. 1973), to the two-year limit of
the old civil rights acts. The court held that the statutory limit applied to single
incidents and not on-going practices of discrimination.
129. See p. 415 supra.
130. In a case denying the jury trial right as to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970), a district court reached its holding in part because the remedy asked was the
same as relief labeled equitable under Title VII. Williams v. Travenal Laboratories,
Inc., 4 E.P.D. 7918 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
131. In the field of employment discrimination, however, there exist some actions
which can be brought under § 1983 but which arguably could not be brought under
Title VII: Shields v. Watrel,'333 F. Supp. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Calhoun v. Doster,
324 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Ala. 1971). These are actions for deprivation of rights not
covered in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II 1972), which reads in relevant part: "No
order of the court [compelling relief shall issue] if such individual was refused ad-
mission, suspended, or expelled . .. for any reason other than discrimination on account
of faith, color, religion, sex, or national origin or" because he attempted to effectuate
this statute.
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vestigations of jury inadequacy argue against broad analogizing from
congressional policies of one statute to another merely similar but
not in effect identical. The strict analogy limits the applicability of
the adequacy principle to the overlap of § 1983 and the modem civil
rights actions under Titles VII and VIII.
The principle of congressionally determined inadequacy as the basis
for invoking equitable jurisdiction embodied by implication in Ross
and Katchen mandates a reversal of Rogers v. Loether and puts the
results reached by most courts in Title VII and § 1983 employment
discrimination suits on a firmer footing. The principle explains and
gives content to the otherwise opaque "abilities and limitations" part
of the Ross test, and shows that the test is indeed of constitutional
stature. Finally, it permits the Court to deal with trial by jury as
modem policies dictate, unhampered by classifications frozen for all
time in Devonian amber.
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CRIMINAL LAWYER
By Arthur Lewis Wood. How professional is the criminal lawyer?
To the extent that there are non-professional elements in the practice of
criminal law, what are the factors which encourage their development
and allow them to persist? How important are law school training, bar
associations, governmental officials in police departments and courts,
civil lawyers, and clients? Are there informal systems of behavior in the
practice which affect the professional character of criminal lawyers?
These questions and many more are answered b'y Professor Wood, De-
partment of Sociology, University of Connecticut.
335 pp. paper, $3.45 cloth, $6.50
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
By Lillian Randolph. Statistical treatment of provisions in the con-
stitutions and rules of procedure of organizations can provide insights
into the purposes of the organizations. Such treatment can also discern
impediments to the realization of purposes, contributions, and operations
of constituent groups. International organizations having nation-states
as members and national organizations consisting of bodies with legis-
lative responsibility are surveyed to develop universal concepts for
organizations with an international, regional, or national membership.
Dr. Randolph has taught at the University of California, Berkeley, and
at California State College, Hayvard.
173 pp. paper, $2.95 cloth, $6.00
THE VIOLENT SOCIETY
By Stuart Palmer. This systematic analysis focuses on three major
forms of violence: criminal homicide, suicide, and mass disorder. Draw-
ing upon his tension theory of deviant and conforming behavior, Dr.
Palmer shows how violence arises from certain quite definite conditions
of the social system and of the individual. The concepts of status, role,
situation, and reciprocity are central to the discussion. The author asserts
what effective steps might be taken to prevent violent behavior in its
several forms. Professor Palmer, University of New Hampshire Sociology
Department, is also author of Deviance and Conformity.
223 pp. paper, $2.95 cloth, $6.50
available direct from the publisher or from your bookstore
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